Abstract
in the banking sector? The preferred policy response of many observers is often financial education to explain the importance of bank account ownership to LMI households. Yet, based on findings from a unique household-level dataset of LMI households, we question whether bank accounts, as they are currently designed, hold the potential to result in real benefits for roughly 20 million "unbanked" and "underbanked" households. Instead, we argue that fundamental changes are required in the products offered by depository institutions in order to improve the financial welfare of LMI households.
There has been tremendous growth in the high-fee alternative financial services (AFS) sector in the United States during the past two decades. The AFS sector plays a significant role in the provision of financial services to low-and moderate-income (LMI) households. Twenty-five percent of low-income American households do not have a either a checking or savings account. These households often use high-fee AFS to convert their paychecks into cash, make payments, and obtain credit (Barr 2004 , Bucks et al. 2006 . A key policy concern is the extent to which LMI households' use of alternative financial services burdens them with excessive fees, reduces their access to lower cost credit, and diminishes their opportunities to save (Barr 2004) . It is a widely held, though not universal, view that bank accounts may mitigate the costs of financial services for LMI households. We argue that unless they are re-designed, bank accounts are unlikely to alleviate the economic burden of financial services for LMI households.
Our argument is based on a careful examination of financial service usage patterns and estimates of annual financial service outlays from household-level survey data on financial services behavior. This survey, which we designed and implemented through the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, is the first dataset to measure households' financial service usage patterns, attitudes, demographics, socio-economic characteristics, and full balance sheet information. Broadly speaking, household-level survey data enables us to measure the portfolio of financial services used by LMI households to transact, save, and borrow, which previous work has not been able to do.
Using these data, we find that LMI households use a combination of AFS and mainstream products. Furthermore, we show that although a larger proportion of unbanked households use AFS products during the month (transactional services) or year (credit services) prior to the survey interview, the differences in AFS usage rates between banked and unbanked households are not substantial. In addition, a large majority of banked households use some type of AFS. Though AFS are associated with high fees, both banked and unbanked respondents describe AFS as "convenient" and "easy to use."
These results suggest that expanding bank account access alone, without changing the relative functionality of bank accounts, is unlikely to reduce unbanked LMI households' use of AFS (Barr 2004) . Similarly, banked households are unlikely to reduce their use of AFS without changes to the functionality of their accounts.
Estimates of the annual outlays on financial services among LMI households living in the Detroit metropolitan area suggest that for the vast majority of households, annual outlays on financial services for transactional and credit products are relatively small. However, a small fraction of LMI households incur high outlays relative to annual household income. This finding contrasts with previous research speculating the burden of financial services based on the posted fees of AFS and mainstream services (Caskey 1994 , Barr 2004 , Seidman and Tescher 2005 , Fellowes and Mabanta 2008 . More specifically, in earlier work, a common calculation to illustrate the high burden of fees entails calculating the hypothetical fees an unbanked household faces to convert $20,000 of income annually at a check cashing outlet. Based on the posted fees of check cashers, this household pays between $400 and $600 annually, or 2-3% of annual income and a nontrivial charge for a service that for many households is free.
2 In contrast, survey evidence from the Detroit area suggests much smaller expenditures, as the median annual outlays for transactional and credit services are $98 and $41, respectively. 3 We acknowledge that these figures may be lower than actually incurred because of respondents' recall problems or other factors. Consistent with their usage patterns, LMI households allocate their spending to both AFS and mainstream products.
We find that the pattern of annual outlays on transactional and credit services differ for the banked and unbanked (Appendix Table A1 categorizes the main financial services we analyze in this paper). Banked households are more economically active than unbanked households and therefore have higher financial service usage and total outlays. This result has two important implications. First, it suggests that financial services fees-in both the AFS and mainstream sectors--are likely to reduce the benefits of policies designed to encourage the economic activity of unbanked LMI households. Second, diminished economic activity among LMI households may contribute to the low level of annual financial services usage and outlays among most LMI households.
We find that households incur substantial non-pecuniary costs to obtain financial services. The non-pecuniary costs incurred by LMI households include time and distance costs. 4 For instance, 37% of households use a bill payment center to pay their bills (typically in cash), rather than using more efficient and less-time consuming payment methods such as on-line bill payment, and 30% find a non-bank-rather than a bank--the most convenient location to obtain their financial services. In addition, the non-pecuniary costs for unbanked households are substantially higher than for banked households.
These results suggest that part of the burden of the financial services system is borne through non-pecuniary channels.
Finally, we find that a large percentage of LMI households move from being banked to being unbanked, and that some banked households were previously involuntarily unbanked. Contrary to popular belief, being unbanked is not a fixed state: 70% of unbanked households have previously had a bank account while 12% of the banked report that a bank closed one of their prior accounts. In light of the permeability of the line between banking and AFS sectors, regulating the AFS sector independently of the banking sector is likely to have perverse consequences. For instance, reducing access to payday loans could lead to more bounced checks and NSF (not sufficient funds) fees, and more bank accounts being closed, or more payday borrowing could reduce creditworthiness and access to mainstream products. We argue that banking and alternative financial sector regulation need to be examined as a system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background details on the alternative financial services sector and discusses the relevant literature. Section three describes the data and defines the categories of financial services discussed in this paper. Section four presents our results on financial service usage patterns and annual outlays on transactional and credit services. Section five concludes and discusses policy implications.
II. Background on Alternative Financial Services and Related Literature
The alternative financial services (AFS) sector in the United States has grown tremendously during the past two decades. Not only have the number of outlets providing check cashing services, payday loans, and pawnshop loans increased, but also the dollar volume of transactions occurring in the AFS sector has increased (Caskey 1994 , Bair 2005 , Stegman 2007 , Fellowes and Mabanta 2008 Greater visibility of AFS has prompted increased attention to these services among researchers, policymakers, and consumer advocates. Though relatively small in the aggregate, the AFS sector plays a significant role in the provision of financial services to low-and moderate-income (LMI) households. Twenty-five percent of low-income American households do not have a either a checking or savings account. These households use high-fee AFS to convert their paychecks into cash, make payments, and obtain credit (Barr 2004 , Bucks et al. 2006 . At the same time, households with bank accounts face annual fees, minimum balance requirements, and bounced check fees, all of which may complicate the rules of bank account ownership and render bank services costly to use. A key policy concern is the extent to which LMI households' use of financial services burdens them with excessive fees, reduces access to or increases the costs of credit, or minimizes opportunities for ready mechanisms to save (Barr 2004) .
Since John Caskey's (1994) seminal work on "fringe banking," the research on financial services for the poor has emphasized the inefficiencies and inequities in the financial services system (Barr 2004 , Seidman and Tescher 2005 , Center for Responsible Lending 2006 , Fellowes and Mabanta 2008 . Because the financial services system is ill-suited to serving LMI households, as earlier studies argue, their financial needs are unmet by the alternative and mainstream sectors. Consequently, LMI households face higher pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs than they otherwise would under a system re-designed to better suit their needs (Barr 2004) . 5 The economic benefits of such a system potentially include fewer numbers of unbanked households, greater ability among LMI households to smooth their consumption via lower cost saving and borrowing instruments, and fewer economic and material hardships among those least able to pay.
For instance, having an account with direct deposit and automatic savings features may increase the ability of LMI households to develop savings that can serve to buffer shocks and increase financial stability.
The potential gains from re-designing the financial services system for LMI households depend (though not exclusively) on these households' usage patterns and annual outlays.
The benefit to households from more functional and lower-fee products have the potential to be large if they are very likely to use high-fee financial services and credit, if their outlays are onerous, or if they have little opportunity to develop savings. On the other hand, lower usage of high-fee services or outlays suggest that the scope for substantially improving the financial lives of LMI households through financial services innovation is likely to be more limited and nuanced.
While other studies use household-level data to provide estimates of usage and outlays and to address the burden of financial services for LMI households (Dunham et al. 1998 , OCC 2000 , Berry 2004 , these earlier papers lack comprehensive information on demographics, socio-economic characteristics, financial service and credit usage patterns, and full balance sheet information in order to quantify more precisely the burden of financial services for LMI households. Without these important measures of economic and financial services activity, previous studies have been unable to comprehensively measure the financial services portfolios of LMI households.
III. Data and Sample
The data for this paper are from the Detroit Area Household Financial Services ( The sample members were selected based on a stratified random sample of the Detroit metropolitan area (Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties). We drew households from census tracts with median incomes that are 0-60 percent ("low"), 61-80 percent ("moderate"), and 81-120 percent ("middle") of the Detroit area's median household income of $49,057. We over-sampled low-and moderate-income strata and undersampled the middle one. Hence, households are more likely to be drawn from the lowand moderate-income strata. Stratum definitions do not, however, restrict the income levels of the households to fall within these ranges. 6 Once we selected a household, the SRC randomly selected an adult to interview from that household (Kish 1949 completion of the data collection, SRC constructed sampling weights that are inversely proportional to the probability of selection. 8 All estimates reported in this paper are weighted, and all standard errors, where provided, are "clustered" at the segment level to account for the intra-segment correlation across individuals.
The sub-sample studied in this paper consists of 938 respondents from the "low"-and "moderate"-income strata. As seen in the top half of Table ( 1), many households in our sample belong to socially disadvantaged groups. Sixty-nine percent self-identify as black or African-American, and 30% have less education than a high school degree. Over twothirds of the sample is female, which reflects that single female-headed households are more common than single-male headed households in the LMI neighborhoods of the Detroit metropolitan area. Table ( 1) compares the DAHFS sample to the U.S. Census's characteristics of the households from the "low"-and "moderate"-income census tracts in the Detroit metropolitan area. Broadly speaking, the demographics of the DAHFS sample matches the Census data well. For sex, education, and marital status distributions, the DAHFS sample differs somewhat from the Census data but in ways that are consistent with the sampling design, which is sensitive to the greater presence of single female-headed households.
IV. Results
The bottom half of Table ( Yet despite relatively low levels of economic activity, LMI households regularly use financial services, as seen in Tables (2) and (3). Banked and unbanked respondents differ in their use of transactional services: generally speaking, the unbanked are less likely to use mainstream services and more likely to use AFS. The unbanked are more likely to receive their income through checks (64% v. 51%) or cash (30% v. 17%); they are also more likely to receive public assistance on the Bridge card (41% v. 14%), reflecting their relatively lower levels of self-sufficiency.
Although the unbanked are more likely to cash checks, on average, those who cash checks convert about the same number of checks per month as the banked. 9 Although banks are the modal institution cashing unbanked respondents' checks, the unbanked are less likely to frequent banks (83% v. 96%) and more likely to use check cashers (31% v. 16%) and grocery/liquor stores (55% v. 21%) to cash checks. The unbanked also are more likely to rely on friends or family to cash their checks on their behalf than are the banked (15% v. 5%). The unbanked are more likely than the banked to use money orders to pay bills or for other purposes. Interestingly, the banked and unbanked are equally likely to use domestic wire transfers, suggesting that the use of these services may depend on the bank account status of the receiving party rather than the sending party.
LMI respondents' use of credit products largely mirrors their use of transactional services: mainstream and AFS products are about equally used. Table ( 3) presents the usage patterns for credit products among all, banked, and unbanked respondents. Refund anticipation loans (RALs) are the most common form of short-term borrowing (28%), followed by taking an overdraft from an account (20%). Pawn shops and taking credit card cash advances are other commonly used borrowing methods (11% and 8%, respectively). Few respondents take out payday loans (3%). Because a bank account and proof of employment are required, most DAHFS respondents may be too disadvantaged to qualify for such loans. 10 Overall, half of LMI households do not use any short-term credit products.
Banked and unbanked respondents use short-term credit products to differing degrees:
broadly, the unbanked are more likely to use products from the AFS sector and less likely to use mainstream products. However, because banked respondents also use AFS, the usage patterns in Table ( 3) suggest that merely having a bank account does not translate into exclusive participation in the financial mainstream. Usage of RALs and pawn shops is significantly higher among the unbanked (37% v. 24% and 21% and 7%, respectively) while bank overdrafts and credit card cash advances are used less by the currently unbanked (11% v. 24% and 2% and 10%, respectively). Notably, however, the unbanked are less likely to have access to a credit card (12% v. 53%), and this lack of access may contribute to their use of other types of credit.
Across all products in the mainstream and alternative sectors, however, banked and unbanked respondents borrow at the same rate. This finding is somewhat striking in that the unbanked are not as economically active as the banked. Lack of employment corresponds to lower usage of transactional services but not to lower usage of short-term credit products. Also, in the DAHFS sample, the unbanked are more likely to experience hardships such as food insufficiency and eviction (not shown), and may borrow to cope with these hardships (or may be unable to economically cope other than through borrowing).
In addition to these usage patterns, we estimate annual outlays on transactional and credit services in Table ( 4) for all, banked, and unbanked respondents. Appendix Table A1 categorizes the financial services that we include in our measures of outlays. These outlays represent the fees that households incur annually for the financial services they consume. The DAHFS study measures the fees that households report they face in their most recent transaction or borrowing. We annualize these fees and assume that the crosssectional variation in fees roughly mirrors the time variation. Fees that households incur from the mainstream sector include annual bank account fees, check-writing and cashing fees, NSF fees, bank overdraft charges, annual credit card fees, and cash advance fees.
AFS fees include those from using money orders, check cashers, domestic remittances, payday loans, refund anticipation loans, pawnshops, and title loans.
As many researchers and policymakers have noted, LMI households face a vast array of high-fee services in both the mainstream and alternative sectors (Caskey 1994 , Barr 2004 , Fellowes and Mabanta 2008 . In addition, these fees are often complicated and confusing. Posted fees of financial services, however, do not fully depict how much households spend on financial services; the quantity of services consumed also matters.
Our estimates of annual outlays incorporate both the respondent's reporting of incurred fees of financial services and the quantity of services consumed.
Overall, as seen in Table ( 4), the median outlay for transactions is $98, or under 1% of the annual income of the households at the 50 th percentile of the transactional outlay distribution. 11 Households at the median allocate roughly half of this amount to services obtained in the AFS sector. Also, the share of outlays going to the AFS sector is roughly constant across the distribution of transactional outlays (not shown). As the distribution of transactional outlays is very right-skewed, 10% of households spend more than $307
annually on transactional services (or 1.5% of the annual income of these households).
Put somewhat differently, 35% of all households' annual transactional outlays are concentrated among the top 10% of households.
Table (4) also shows that the median outlay for credit is $41, which is also a small share of annual income of the households at the 50 th percentile of the credit outlay distribution.
Less than half of this amount is for AFS products, and this share is roughly constant across the credit outlay distribution (not shown). Like the distribution for transactional outlays, the credit distribution is also very right-skewed: 10% of households spend more than $398 to obtain credit (or between 3% and 15% of annual income). 12 Fifty seven percent of all households' annual credit outlays are concentrated among the top 10% of households.
Banked and unbanked differences in annual outlays are also in Table (4) . Interestingly, median outlays on transactional and credit services for the banked respondents are higher than for the unbanked ($97 v. $85 and $58 v. $0, respectively). 13 This is also true at the 90 th percentile of the two distributions of outlays.
In spite of having access to (arguably) lower-fee financial services, the banked spend more than the unbanked. Looking first at transactional services, despite spending more, the banked spend a slightly smaller share of their income than the unbanked (0.5% v.
1.0%), although overall, the levels of spending are quite low. As a share of income, the 11 The appendix details the methods used to estimate these fees. 12 The average among these households is around 5%. 13 Even when looking at the fees per transaction, the banked spend more than the unbanked because of their greater use of transactions requiring a non-trivial, one-time payment (e.g. bank account annual fees, tax preparation fees). These results are available upon request. Although annual outlays are low for the majority of LMI households, Table (5) shows that the non-pecuniary costs of financial services are non-trivial. For 30% of respondents, a check casher or grocery/liquor store, which typically do not provide lowfee services, is the most convenient location for financial services. In other words, 30% may incur the "cost of inconvenience" to physically access a bank or ATM. The unbanked are more likely to report that a check casher or grocery/liquor store is the most convenient location (62% v. 17.3%), which is consistent with their decision to not have a bank account. Among the renters, 55% have landlords that accept checks, which, by restricting their payment options, (weakly) adds to the cost of paying their rent. A smaller fraction of the unbanked has landlords that accept checks relative to those with bank accounts (38% v. 65%). Table ( 5) also shows that 37% of respondents (33% of banked, 45% of unbanked) use bill payment centers, which are typically associated with long lines, to pay their bills. 14 Estimates of annual outlays exclude these non-pecuniary costs even though they may be non-trivial.
14 Fewer respondents (23%) use automated payment methods to pay their bills.
The estimates in Table ( suggesting that one's attachment to the financial mainstream is unlikely to be driven by purely inter-generational factors.
V. Discussion and Policy Implications
Based on these results, we argue that bank account ownership may not alleviate the economic burden of financial services for LMI households unless those accounts are significantly redesigned. Because the use of AFS is prevalent among LMI households, even those with bank accounts, the products the mainstream sector provides are currently either insufficient or costly (for these households), so as to perhaps discourage use on the extensive and intensive margins. Hence regulating the AFS sector is likely to have consequences in the mainstream sector (and vice versa), as households optimize among the choices they face.
We find that, overall, annual outlays as a percent of income are low for most LMI households with and without bank accounts. However, in spite of measuring a modest annual pecuniary burden of financial services, we believe that this measure is not a sufficient statistic for the economic burden of the financial services system for LMI households. Notably, these households may curtail their use of financial services in response to the high posted fees they face. One reason why outlays may be low is that LMI households, by definition, are not as economically active as their higher-income counterparts. Policies to lower fees for financial services may thus encourage the use of financial services, and it remains unclear whether lowering prices would also lead to reduced outlays. Furthermore, if households shop around in order to avoid the most expensive option, annual outlays do not include these search costs.
There are other reasons to believe that annual outlays on financial services do not provide an adequate measure of LMI households' well-being. Annual outlays alone do not capture whether households have been victims of predatory practices or poor disclosure practices regarding the fees they face. Our estimates of annual outlays do not capture the costs that LMI households incur over a lifetime as they open and close bank accounts.
Many LMI households face limited access to credit, which both limits the fees they can incur and their ability to smooth consumption in the event of negative income shocks.
Moreover, many LMI households may benefit from a better mechanism through which to accumulate savings, both to buffer shocks and for longer-term goals.
In this paper, we can only speculate that high cost financial services increase the economic challenges faced by LMI households. Further research is needed to rigorously assess the how the financial services system compounds the difficulties these households face as they cope with fluctuations in income that occur because of job changes, instability in hours worked, medical illnesses or emergencies, changes in family composition, or other factors that can unexpectedly change income and needs. At low income levels, small income fluctuations may create serious problems for financial management.
From the perspective of supply, the administrative costs of collecting small-value deposits are high in relation to banks' potential earnings on the relatively small amounts saved, unless the bank can charge high fees; with sufficiently high fees, however, it is not clear that utilizing a bank account makes economic sense for many LMI households.
Indeed, the current structure of bank accounts is likely one of the primary reasons why Source: Detroit Area Household Financial Services study. 22 Other than when they have moved.
